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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NELDA GARCIA,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant, :
v.

:

FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief,
Driver License Services,
Department of Public Safety,
State of Utah,

:

Case No. 890649-CA

:
Category No. 14(b)

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the final Judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court which, after review de novo, affirmed the
decision of the Division of Driver License Services to revoke for
one year, the driving privilege of Appellant Nelda L. Garcia.

It

is not disputed that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) and Utah R. App. P. 3(a).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Garcia's failure to continue to blow into

the Intoxilyzer until a printed result was obtained constitutes a
"refusal" under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2) (1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953).
Utah R. Civ. P. 52.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final Judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Raymond J. Uno, presiding.
After review de novo, Judge Uno affirmed the decision
of the Division of Driver Licence Services, to revoke for a
period of one year, the driving privileges of Appellant Nelda L.
Garcia.

Judge Uno concluded that Garcia had failed to comply

with Utah Code Ann, § 41-6-44.10 by refusing to do what was
necessary to provide a viable breath sample for the intoxilyzer
test.
Garcia moved for and received a Stay of the Order of
Revocation of her operator's licence pending this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
On March 30, 1989, Appellant, Nelda L. Garcia (Garcia)
was arrested by West Valley City Police Officer LaMar A. Burns
(Officer Burns) for driving under the influence of alcohol.
(Trial Transcript, Filed 1/2/90, (hereinafter T.) 9). Officer
Burns requested that Garcia take a chemical test (intoxilyzer
test) to determine her blood alcohol content.

Garcia verbally

consented to the test (T. 10).
After arriving at the station, Officer Burns, a
certified intoxilyzer operator, prepared the machine for use by
going through an operational checklist (T. 10-11).

He then

instructed Garcia in the proper use of the machine (T. 11).
Garcia then blew into the machine, but did not continue blowing
long enough to provide a sufficient sample.

Officer Burns

instructed Garcia that she needed to blow longer into the machine
-2-

(T. 11-12). Officer Burns even changed the mouthpiece, but Garcia
would pull away and refuse to blow until the machine could obtain
an adequate sample (T. 13). Officer Burns then advised Garcia
that failure to give an adequate sample would result in the
revocation of her licence for a period of one year and admonished
her to again blow into the machine (T. 14). During further
attempts, Garcia continued to pull away from the machine and
never provided a sufficient breath sample.

Officer Burns

recorded the digital read-out visible on the machine (T. 13-15),
informed Garcia that her failure to give an adequate sample would
be considered a refusal, and turned off the machine.
no request to try the test again.

Garcia made

Monthly technical tests

established that the machine had been functioning properly before
and after Garcia's test

(See Appendix "D"; Utah Dept. of Public

Safety Record of Intoxilyzer Test and Affidavits dated March 17,
1989 and April 17, 1989).

Garcia did not complain of any

impairment which would affect her ability to perform the test (T.
15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The overwhelming authority supports the conclusion that
refusal to take an intoxilyzer test need not be verbal.

Several

Courts, including the Supreme Court of this State have held that
the purpose of the implied consent statute is to require the
driver to do whatever is necessary to determine their state of
intoxication.

Therefore, failure to do whatever is necessary,

has been held to be a refusal pursuant to the provisions of the
statute.

In addition, the digital read-out recorded by Officer

Burns is not an accurate measure of a driver's blood alcohol
content.

o_

Finally, the issue of refusal is an issue of fact, to
be determined by the trial court.

It is only reversible upon a

showing that the lower court's determination was clearly
erroneous.

No such showing has been made, or even attempted by

the appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BY FAILING TO DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO
MEASURE HER BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT, GARCIA
REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO CHEMICAL TESTING
PURSUANT TO THE UTAH IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE.
Utah's implied consent statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-644.10(2)(a) (1989), provides in pertinent part:
If any person has been placed under arrest,
and has then been requested by a peace
officer to submit to any one or more of the
chemical tests under Subsection (1), and
refuses to submit to the chemical test, or
any one or all of the tests requested, the
person shall be warned by a peace officer
requesting the test or tests that a refusal
to submit to the test or tests can result in
revocation of his license to operate a motor
vehicle.
Garcia contends that she did nothing to constitute a
volitional refusal to take the test.

In Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d

1335 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that a refusal
under the implied consent statute does not mean that the driver
must verbally refuse to comply with the test, nor does it suggest
that the driver must be obstinate or uncooperative.

The Court

determined that a refusal, is simply a volitional failure to do
whatever is necessary to perform the test.
There is no mysterious meaning to the word
'refusal'. In the context of the implied
consent law, it simply means that an
-4-

arrestee, after having been requested to take
the breathalyzer test, declines to do so of
his own volition. Whether the declination is
accomplished by verbally saying, 'I refuse',
or by remaining silent and just not breathing
or blowing into the machine, or by vocalizing
some sort of qualified or conditional consent
or refusal, does not make any difference.
The volitional failure to do what is
necessary in order that the test can be
performed is a refusal.
Id. at 1338 (emphasis added).
The Court further stated:
Plaintiff, however, presses upon us the
argument that under the law a refusal must be
an express, unequivocal refusal before a
drivers's license may be revoked.
This interpretation of the statute would
effectively emasculate it and is without
foundation in authority or logic. If this
argument were accepted, any person driving
under the influence of alcohol could avoid
having his license revoked by temporizing,
equivocating, or simply remaining silent, as
the facts of this case clearly illustrate.
The irony of the argument is that a person
inebriated to the point of unconsciousness
would be saved from the loss of his license.
It is the reality of the
govern, and a refusal in
the words that accompany
convincing as an express

situation that must
fact, regardless of
it, can be as
verbal refusal.

Id. at 1337, 1338.
In Cowan v. Schwendiman, 769 P.2d 280 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) the Utah Court of Appeals decided a case very similar to
the current controversy.

Mr. Cowan was taken to the police

station for an intoxilyzer test.

His first test was invalid

because he had been chewing tobacco.

When the officer recogniz

the error, he requested that Cowan submit to a second test.
Although verbally agreeing to further testing the plaintiff did
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not provide the requisite breath sample.

The Court concluded

that this behavior constituted a refusal and stated:
[W]hen asked to breathe into the testing
machine on each occasion, appellant
obstructed the process by sticking his tongue
over and chewing on the mouthpiece and
blowing out the sides of his mouth. This
conduct prevented the officers from obtaining
an adequate viable breath sample for testing.
Id. at 281.
The courts of this State have clearly established that
a refusal may occur despite words or intentions signifying
compliance.

In Mathie v.

Schwendiman, 656 P.2d 463 (Utah 1982)

the driver repeatedly affirmed to the officer his intent to
comply with the tests; however, he refused to remove a piece of
gum from his mouth.

The Utah Supreme Court held:

In Beck v. Cox, (citation omitted) this Court
declared that a refusal to take a chemical
test may be established on the basis of
conduct of the motorist, if he has been asked
to take the test. Quoting Spradling v.
Deimeke, (citation omitted) this Court said:
'the volitional failure to do what is
necessary in order that the test can be
performed is a refusal.'
Id. at 464.
Similarly, in Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736 (Utah
1984) when the arresting officer requested that Conrad submit to
a breathalyzer test, Conrad replied that he would take a blood
test instead.

The Utah Supreme Court noted:

Plaintiff's failure to agree to take the
breathalyzer test after having been asked at
least four times to do so is undeniably a
refusal to take the test. It is not
necessary that the refusal be in unequivocal
terms. It is sufficient if the behavior of
the driver indicates his intention to refuse.
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Id- at 738.
Volitional failure to do what is necessary in order to
obtain a viable breath sample is a refusal, regardless of what
the person may say or do to indicate compliance.

Failure to

provide an adequate breath sample has been held in numerous
jurisdictions to constitute a refusal-

See Brinkerhoff v-

Commonwealth Department of Transportation Bureau of Traffic
Safety, 430 A.2d 339 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (Brinkerhoff tried to
"blow into the machine between ten and fifteen times • . . but he
could not introduce sufficient air into the breathalyzer for it
to analyze-"); Matter of Pinyatello, 36 N.C- App. 542, 245 S-E.2d
185 (1978) (Pinyatello "blew as hard as he could but the machine
did not register."); White v- State Department of Public Safety,
361 So.2d 265 (La. App. 1978) (Plaintiff testified that he did
not refuse-he just couldn't blow harder due to a medical
condition); Woolman v. State, Department of Motor Vehicles, 15
Wash. App. 115, 547 P.2d 293 (1976) ("Woolman did not articulate
in any verbal way an unqualified refusal to take the breathalyzer
test.

She did put the mouthpiece of the breathalyzer into her

mouth and she did blow into it, but not enough to cause the
machine to operate. . . " ) ;

Application of Kunneman, 501 P.2d

910 (Okla. App. 1972) ("We therefore hold that even though one
charged with the crime of driving while under the influence of
intoxicating beverages orally states he will submit to a
breathalyzer test, but refuses to blow his breath into the
machine is a non-verbal refusal.").

-7-

Garcia asserts that because she verbally gave her
consent to the breath test, she complied and should not have her
license revoked.

However, she failed to do what was necessary to

provide an adequate breath sample.

Officer Burns testified that

on at least four occasions she put the mouthpiece in her mouth,
gave a small puff, and then pulled away.

Despite his warnings

that she could lose her license, and despite his efforts to
encourage her to comply, Garcia refused to do what was necessary
to provide an adequate breath sample.
Providing an adequate breath sample is not a difficult
thing.

Garcia testified that she had no medical condition which

prevented her from compliance with the Officer's requests.

The

uncontroverted facts are simply that Garcia never attempted to
provide a longer breath sample.

Finding otherwise in this case,

would make it easy for everybody to refuse to take a test, but,
still not have their license revoked.

They would merely have to

put the mouthpiece to their mouth, blow for a second or two, not
long enough to give a printed reading, and then allege
compliance.
POINT II
THE DIGITAL READ-OUT RECORDED BY OFFICER
BURNS IS NOT AN ACCURATE MEASURE OF BLOOD
ALCOHOL CONTENT.
Garcia contends that the digital read-out recorded by
Officer Burns is the equivalent of a printed read out for the
purpose of interpreting her blood alcohol level.

Her argument

fails to comprehend the basic mechanics of the intoxilyzer.
intoxilyzer provides a digital read-out of the blood alcohol
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The

level immediately upon detection of alcohol in the breath.
However, this read-out is not accurate since it is the "deep
lung" sample which gives the correct blood alcohol level (T. 15).
The "deep lung" sample is not obtained until a person has exhaled
into the machine for a period of time required to produce the
printed read-out.

Officer Burns' uncontroverted testimony was

that a "deep lung" sample was necessary in order to obtain an
accurate reading (T. 14). Garcia provided no evidence to the
contrary, and no evidence indicating the visual read-out was
accurate.

Upon cross examination, Officer Burns testified that

he had never given testimony in court based on a digital reading.
The facts of the instant case are similar to those in
Jones v. Motor Vehicles Division, 90 Or. App. 143, 750 P.2d 1203
(1987).

The Oregon Court of Appeals analyzing a statute

substantially similar to Utah's implied consent statute stated:
"The only issue is whether petitioner's failure to continue to
blow into the Intoxilyzer until a printed result was obtained
constitutes a 'refusal' under ORS 813.100(3)." Id. at 1204.
In Jones, the driver blew into the intoxilyzer until a
.18 registered on the digital display, but he "failed to blow
long enough and with sufficient force to produce a printout. . ."
Id. at 1204. The Oregon Court of Appeals found that, despite the
digital read-out, Jones' failure to provide an adequate breath
sample for the machine to print, constituted a refusal.

The

Court therefore suspended Jones' license for a year.
Garcia contends, however, that because she blew enough
air into the machine for a digital read out to be recorded, her
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effort cannot be termed a "refusal"

A similar argument was made

in Newman v. Stinson, 489 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1972).

After blowing

into the equipment once, and failing to give an adequate sample,
the driver refused to blow again on grounds that he had complied
with the law. The court held:
The statute does not prescribe any particular
volume of air which must be breathed into the
equipment to constitute compliance.
In the
absence of a showing of the impossibility of
compliance or the likelihood of harm
resulting therefrom, we feel that the
requirement of submission to the test
contemplates that a sufficient sample be
given to permit a test to be made and a test
result obtained. The appellee did not
sufficiently comply.
Id. at 828
POINT III
WHETHER GARCIA REFUSED TO TAKE THE BLOOD
ALCOHOL TEST IS A QUESTION OF FACT,
DETERMINED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT
REVIEWABLE EXCEPT UPON A SHOWING OF CLEAR
ERROR.
Refusal is a question of fact.

In Wolf v. State

Department of Motor Vehicles, 27 Wash. App. 214, 616 P.2d 688
(1980) the Court said:
Unwillingness to cooperate in the
administration of a breathalyzer test is a
refusal to take the test (citations omitted).
Whether the driver's conduct amounts to a
refusal to take the test is a question of
fact.
^d. at 690.
Rule 52, Utah R. Civ. P. states:

"Findings of fact,

whether based on oral or documentary evidence shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous. . . . "

This rule finds wide

support in the appellate courts of this state.
-10-

"On appeal of a

judgment from the bench after trial, the appellate court defers
to the trial courts factual assessment unless there is clear
error."

Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance &

Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988)-

In Lopez v. Schwendiman,

720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986), the Court stated:
In a trial de novo, the district court must
determine by a preponderance of evidence
'whether the petitioner's license is subject
to revocation under the provisions of this
chapter.' (citations omitted). Our review of
that determination is deferential to the
trial court's review of the evidence unless
the trial court has misapplied principles of
law or its findings are clearly against the
weight of the evidence.
Id. at 780.
Garcia has not raised an issue of law, nor has her
counsel attempted to present evidence that the trial court's
findings were clearly erroneous.

Even a cursory review of Utah

law in this area would have revealed that the issue of refusal is
well settled in this State.

The Court of Appeals in deciding

Cowan v. Schwendiman, 769 P.2d 280 (Utah 1989) stated:
Based on well-settled authority in Utah, we
reject appellant's contentions as frivolous.
The revocation of appellant's driver's
license is summarily affirmed. A sanction of
double costs is awarded to respondent,
pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 33(a).
Id. at 282.
This appeal is frivolous and contrary to the clear
principles of law firmly established by the courts of this state.
Appellant's brief fails to raise appealable issues. Further,
Appellant's brief is merely a restatement of the trial
transcript, citing no authority in support of her position.

-11-

CONCLUSION
Because Garcia refused to provide an adequate air
sample when expressly instructed to do so, she failed to comply
with Utah Code § 41-6-44.10. Therefore, her licence was properly
suspended.

Both the Hearing Officer and the Trial Court properly

concluded that, given the vast authority on the subject, Garcia's
actions constituted a volitional refusal.

DATED this

^

day of June, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

RICHARD D. WYSS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Francis J. Nielson, attorney for appellant, 310 South Main, Suite
1305, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101, this
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day of June, 1990.

APPENDICIES

APPENDIX A

41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or
drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning,
report — Hearing, revocation of license — Appeal — Person incapable of refusal — Results of
test available — Who may give test — Evidence.
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to
have given hjrs consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44, if the test is or teste are administered at the direction of a peace
officer having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or m
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44.
(b) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered
and how many of them are administered, except the officer shall request
that either the blood or urine test be administered under Section
76-5-207. If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to
take one or more requested tests, even though he doesTsubmit to any other
rgguested tept nr *gg*s, i g Q rpfusaj under this section.
(c) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test
or tests to be administered. The failure ° r inability of a p??rp nffjrpr_t.o
arrange for any specific test is not a defense to taking a test rPfllIpfitpf* hy
a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests.
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, and has then been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical
tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to the chemical test or
any one or all of the tests requested, the person shall be warned by a
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the
test or tests can result in revocation of his license to operate a motor
vehicle. Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests
that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, no test may be given. A peace officer shall serve on the person, on
behalf of the division, immediate notice of the division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. If the
officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the division, he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days; and
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the division,
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the division. A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form
by the division, serve also as the temporary license. The peace officer
shall submit a signed report, within five days after the date of the
arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited or
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44 and that the person had
refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1).
(b) A person who has been notified of the division's intention to revoke
his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. A request for the
hearing shall be made in writing, and within ten days after the date of
the arrest. Within 20 days after receiving a written request, the division
shall notify the person of his opportunity to be heard as early as practicable. If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing

Delore tfte division, ftis privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah shall
be revoked for a period of one year beginning on the 31st day after the
date of arrest
(c) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the division, and the division determines that the person was requested to submit
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if
the person fails to appear before the division as required in the notice, the
division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in
Utah for one year, beginning on the date the hearing is held The division
shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee imposed under
Subsection 41-2-112(6), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative
costs The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court
decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the
revocation was improper
(d) (l) Any person whose license has been revoked by the division under this section may seek judicial review
(n) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a
trial Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person
resides
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the
test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or
tests shall be made available to him
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Subsection 26-1-30(19), acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content This
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Subsection 26-1-30(19) who, at the direction of a peace officer,
drawrs a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason
to believe is driving m violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered
according to standard medical practice
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests
administered at the direction of a peace officer
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the
direction of a peace officer
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the
taking of an> test
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to ha\e
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug
History C 1953, 41-6-44 10, enacted b> L
1981, ch 126, § 43, L 1983, ch 99, § 16,
1987, ch 129, § 3, 1987, ch 138, * 41, 1987,
ch 161, § 143, 1987 (1st S S ), ch 8, §§ 3, 4,
1988, ch 148, § 1
Repeals and Enactments — Laws 1981
ch 126 $ 43 repealed former § 41 6 44 10 (L
1957 ch 80 §[1] 1959 ch 65 § 1, 1967 ch
88 § 3 1969 ch 107 § 3 1977 ch 268 § 4),

relating to implied consent to tests and en
acted present § 41 6 44 10
Amendment Notes — The 1987 amend
ment by Chapter 129 rewrote the provisions
of Subsection (2» as last amended by Laws
1983 ch 99 § 16 to the extent that a detailed
analysis is impracticable and made minor
changes in phraseolog} and punctuation
throughout the entire section

APPENDIX B

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, in Subdivision (a), deleted "and" preceding "in granting" in the first sentence, inserted
the third and fifth sentences, rewrote the sixth
sentence and added the last sentence

Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F R C P
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53
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APPENDIX C

LyiM_DEPT^_OF_PyBL^^
I/W^t/e undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that:
Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, serial numberJ^S^/^2d^2fr
located at JyC^%TJl^/l^U $b
was properly checked by me/us in
the course of official duties, on
This was done by a currently certified technician and according
to the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah
Department of Public Safety.
This is the official record and notes of this procedure which
were made at the time these tests were done.
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE:
( ^E^lectr ical power check:
(Power switch on power indicator light is on)
( i/) Temperature check (Ready light is on)
( ^'Internal purge check:
Akir pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds.•
( ^} Zero set, Error indicator, and Printer Check:
(Zero set at .000, .001, .002, .003.)
(With proper zero set, printer works properly)...
(Error light activates with improper zero set)...
(Printer deactivated when error light is on)
ixed absorption calibrator test (if equipped)
(Reads within +/- .01 of calibration setting)....
( tS) Checked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests
/within +/- .005 or 5X whichever is the greatest)....
( [/) Gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters
of breath
REPAIRS REQUIRED(Explain
in ) _AlM^-u^f&Jj££22

YES

NO

IS)/

(

(
(
^
( <-*
( £->
(
(

^

(

)

("ZFThe" simulator

solution was of the correct kind and
properly compounded
( Af The results of this test show that the instrument
is working properly

)
( ^

)

Last prior check of this instrument was done G^„J^_JZ£J&£4&?¥l&IZfc
CBRTIFIBD, BRBATH TEST TBCHNICT^*^
STATB OF UTAH
. )
COUNTY Wd£b&£2&&&-,
r

I/We, on oath, s t a t e , jrtiat^the

foregoing

/Is t r j

!^ST

f JSKSrtSiS.
\&&£Z^

J* 0 ** Pubfe
c^f^NJOHN

•
|

SufcibSgraP a n j t e ^ ^ f o r e
-C^bf^ta^-W^SSS-s:
Notary Public*/
.

me t h i s /T^day

cf

^2?o^

<*£-

19j£_

City of R e s i d e n c e , ^ ^ * ^ ^ ! - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ —
County of Residence.

1

y?

TAOKPT^OF.PUHM^
he undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that:
Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, serial number J ? ^ / ^ ^ ^ 2 s ^
located atj^£$^'/?JJ/>C/
f^P
was properly checked by me/us in
the course of official duties, on
f^j#&&A-^£-2--^//Jj26ltM2. This was done by a currently certified technician and according
to the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah
Department of Public Safety.
3. This is the official record and notes of this procedure which
were made at the time these tests were done.
4. I am/we are competent to testify and have personal knowledge of
the matters alleged in this affidavit.
YES
_.__ FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE:
NO
THE
( ^^Electrical power check:
(Power switch on power indicator light is on)
( ^^Temperature check (Ready light is on)
*
( /^Tnternal purge check:
Jtfir pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds
^
( ^ f Zero set, Error indicator, and Printer Check:
(Zero set at .000, .001, .002, .003.)
(With proper zero set, printer works properly).
(Error light activates with improper zero set).,
(Printer deactivated when error light is on)...
absorption calibrator test (if equipped)
(Reads within +/- .01 of calibration setting)..
)
( ^-Cl^cked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests
within +/- .005 or 5* whichever is the greatest).,
)
( ^"tfives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters
of b r e a t h
yCx
)
REPAIRS REQUIRED ( E x p l a i n ) ^0££~J&k0JLl£ieM^
)
€£#.L

-u
-r

simulator solution was of the correct kind and
prpperly compounded
,
^"tfhe results of this test show that the instrument
is working properly
,

(

)

Last p r i o r check of t h i s i n s t r u m e n t was done on //*
/£7rff\Gt/
19>^fe
CERTIFIED, BRE^dl TEjT TECHNICIANS) ,

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY
0?^4^?3^

I/We, on o a t h , s t a t e t h a t

the

NotayPufafc
t
JEROLYNJOHN
F
S757 South 320 West r
Murray. Utah 84107 '

ire me this /7.^lLday of
k

-*w*^

iSstt^

19_f.£.

SafeofUWt

ttary Public
My commission expires

City of Residence rd^ e -4^.-^^S^trl.
County of Residence_^H^t^3^.^R^iC^=ri

